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the electorate a constitutional power to remove legislative power from a legislative
body in any way other than to legislate in place of that body by initiative or to
cancel previously enacted legislation by referendum. The electorate cannot by
initiative ordinance directly arrogate legislative power to itself as it attempts to
do here.
Since fluoridation has been held to be a valid exercise of the local police
power,56 it is clear that the citizens of Lincoln could vote to fluoridate by mitia-
tive, invalidate by referendum a fluoridation ordinance passed by the city council,
or even repeal such an ordinance by an initiative ordinance once the time for
referendum has passed. There is, however, no power in the people of a general
law municipality which permits them so to alter directly at their caprice the spec-
trum of municipal powers which the constitution and the state legislature place
in their legislative body.
Conclusion
Representative institutions are not without weaknesses. Too often history has
seen the representatives of the people place their own interests above those of
their electors. Therefore one cannot quarrel with the goal of the judiciary in trying
to strike a balance between direct and representative government. However, if
there are to be limitations on direct legislation, the rationale behind them should
be clearly enunciated. In mumcipal affairs, emphasis should be clearly placed on
the judicial objective of confining the initiative to decisions which determine
municipal policy, and the reasoning behind the rule that matters of local concern
cannot be subject to referendum in general law cities should be given careful
consideration before a similar limitation is placed on the referendum in chartered
cities. In connection with matters of statewide concern, the legislative-admmis-
trative test should be abandoned. Lastly, in assessing proposed mitiative measures,
the courts must take care that the people in their zeal to invalidate unpopular
legislation do not exercise powers they do not possess.
Michael B. P Wilmar*
56 De Aryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 681-82, 260 P.2d 98, 102 (1953).
* Member, Second Year Class.
CHARACTERIZATION OF PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA
WHEN PERIOD OF ACQUISITION OVERLAPS
CREATION OR TERMINATION OF
MARITAL COMMUNITY
The marital community is both created and terminated at a particular instant
in time. However there is often a lapse of time between the initial step taken in
the acquisition of some interest in property and the perfection of this interest.
Thus the acquisition of property may overlap the creation or termination of the
marital community. Because the extent of a spouse's interest in some item of
property may depend on its character as community or separate, the courts are
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often faced with the complex problem of characterizing property where acquisi-
tion overlaps the creation or termination of the marital community. This note
presents a discussion of the principles of characterization under California law
in the hope that this will clarify the problem. Further, an analytical techmque is
suggested to facilitate characterization m those cases which are complicated by
divorce.
The Cbaracterization of Property
The problem of characterizing property as community or separate is in itself
not difficult. The "reasonable man" of the law, given an explanation of the dis-
tinction between community and separate property, could handle most problems
of characterization. The characterization will usually be obvious from a complete
knowledge of the circumstances concerning the acquisition of a particular interest
in property. This simplicity is probably the reason the courts often characterize
property without carefully analyzing the process of characterization. As a result
the courts often appear to have confused the facts upon which characterization
depends with the principles upon which it is based. In complicated cases it is
imperative that this distinction be recognized and that the characterization be
based on established principles, rather than on some isolated fact which is suffi-
cient for characterization only in ordinary cases.
When the character of property as community or separate is not determined
by statute,1 or by agreement between the spouses, 2 it is determined by the appli-
cation of two principles: (1) the character of property is fixed at the time of
acquisition,s and (2) the property retains its original character even when traded,
sold, or otherwise changed in form or identity.4 To apply these two principles,
one must know the time and mode of acquisition of the property.5 The distinc-
tion, however, between the principles which control the characterization and the
facts which are necessary for characterization is not always made by the courts.
Frequently it has been stated that the character of property as community or
separate is determined by proof showing the mode of acquisition.6 This is mis-
leading. The character of property is determined from knowledge of the time and
mode of acquisition; but only where property is acquired by gift, bequest, devise
or descent, or as an award of damages for personal injuries, is the character de-
termined directly by the mode of acquisition.7 -
A complete knowledge of the details of the transaction by which property is
acquired is necessary for characterization. Where the property acquired is in the
1 CAL. CoNsr. art. XX, § 8; CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 162, 163, 164, 687.
2 See, e.g., Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1, 371 P.2d 745 (1962);
Woods v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d 657 (1956).
3 Calloway v. Dowme, 195 Cal. App. 2d 348, 352, 15 Cal. Rptr. 747, 749 (1961);
Belmont v. Belmont, 188 Cal. App. 2d 33, 42, 10 Cal. Rptr. 227, 232 (1961); Garten
v. Garten, 140 Cal. App. 2d 489, 492, 295 P.2d 23, 25 (1956).
4 Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 317 (1944).
5 DePuy v. Shay, 127 Cal. App. 476, 478, 16 P.2d 158, 159 (1932).
6 Bias v. Reed, 169 Cal. 33, 42, 145 Pac. 516, 519 (1914); Estate of Foy, 109 Cal.
App. 2d 329, 333, 240 P.2d 685, 687 (1952); Coucher v. Goudher, 82 Cal. App. 449,
456, 255 Pac. 892, 895 (1927).
7 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-63.5 provide that property acquired during mamage by
any of the means listed in the text is separate property.
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nature of a windfall, where no legal or equitable interest can be considered to
have been given in exchange for the interest acquired, its character depends on
the time a legally cognizable right to or interest in the property is first acquired.8
If such a right or interest is acquired during the existence of the marital com-
munity by one of the spouses, the property is community;9 if it is acquired before
creation10 or after termination" of the community, the property is separate. Of
course, the first legally cognizable right to the property, or interest therein, may
be acquired some time before full ownership in the property itself is acquired.' 2
Where property is acquired in exchange for other property or for labor, its
character depends on the character of that which was given for the exchange.
If property is acquired in exchange for other property, then the character of the
property acquired is determined by determining the character of the property
which was given.'8 If property is acquired in exchange for labor then its char-
acter will depend upon when the services rendered in exchange for the property
were performed.14 The labor of the spouses during the existence of the com-
munity is usually'5 community labor. Property received in exchange for such
labor is community property.16 Property received in exchange for services ren-
dered before creation17 or after termination 8 of the community is separate
property.
The Characterization of Property and the Creation of the Community
The fact that property is acquired over a period of time which includes the
creation of the community does not usually complicate its characterization. The
problems which develop under these circumstances are readily solved if the courts
carefully ascertain all of the facts concerning the acquisition and then apply the
principles upon which characterization depends.
8 Cases where property is acquired by adverse possession are the classic examples
of this situation. Crouch v. Richardson, 158 La. 822, 104 So. 728 (1925); Sauvage v.
Wauhop, 143 S.W 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). Califorma courts appear to have ac-
cepted the reasoning of these cases, but a simple question of characterization of property
acquired solely by adverse possession overlapping either the creation or termination of
the community has apparently never been decided by California appellate courts. See
Siddall v. Haight, 132 Cal. 320, 64 Pac. 410 (1901) (parol gift); Pancoast v. Pancoast,
57 Cal. 320 (1881) (release of clai in exchange for deed).
9Ibtd.
10 Estate of Clark, 94 Cal. App. 453, 271 Pac. 542 (1928).
"1French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
12 Estate of Clark, 94 Cal. App. 453, 271 Pac. 542 (1928).
18 Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 Pac. 640 (1926).
14 Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
15 The earnings of a spouse may be made separate property by agreement. Kalt-
schmidt v. Weber, 145 Cal. 596, 79 Pac. 272 (1904); Gianotti v. McDonald, 213 Cal.
App. 2d 744, 29 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1963). Under certain conditions where the spouses
are living separate and apart their earnings will be separate property. CAL. Civ. CODE
§§ 169, 169.1, 169.2, 175. Also, the wife may become a sole trader by complying with
statutory requirements and her earnings will be separate property. CAL. CODE Civ. Pioc.
§ 1819.
16 Martin v. Southern Pacific Co., 130 Cal. 285, 62 Pac. 515 (1900); Garten v.
Garten, 140 Cal. App. 2d 489, 295 P.2d 23 (1956).
17 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 162-63.
's Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
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If the property is in the nature of a windfall its character is determined at
the time when a legally cognizable interest in it was first acquired. For instance,
when title to the property is acquired merely by the adverse possession of one
of the spouses, the character of the property is determined by whether the com-
munity existed at the time when title to the property was acquired.' 9 Prior to
the acquisition of title the possessor has no legally cogmzable interest in the
property. However, in Siddall v. Haight,20 possession of a lot was acquired by a
parol gift and title was subsequently acquired by adverse possession against the
donor. In this case the court held that a legally cognizable interest was acquired
by the gift. This occurred before the marital community was created. Even
though title was subsequently acquired by adverse possession during mamage,
the property was characterized as separate, not community.
It is not the fact that title is acquired by operation of law in cases of adverse
possession which determines the character of the property. It is merely the fact
that, in the usual case, prior to the acquisition of title the possessor has no legally
cognizable interest in the property. Thus, where title to part of a tract of land is
conveyed to a mere trespasser in exchange for a release by hun of a wrongful
claim to the entire tract, the character of the property acquired by the trespasser
is determined at the time of the conveyance.21 Wrongful possession is not a legally
cognizable interest in land for the purposes of characterization.22 In releasing his
wrongful claim the grantee exchanged nothing for the conveyance and the prop-
erty was characterized at the time the first cognizable interest was acquired. This
was when title was acquired by the deed.
The characterization of property in the nature of a windfall according to the
time at which a legally cognizable right or interest is first acquired is not re-
stricted to real property. In Estate of Clark23 it was held that a statutory right
of an heir to contest a will is a legally cognizable interest. Property received in
a compromise settlement releasing this right is characterized as of the time the
right was acquired by virtue of the death of the decedent. Since the death oc-
curred prior to marriage of the heir in this case, his right to contest the will and,
therefore, the property received in compromise of this right, were separate
property.
When the acquisition of property, either in exchange for other property or as
the product of labor, overlaps the creation of the marital community, the char-
acter of the property acquired depends upon the character of that which was
given in exchange.2 4 In such cases the character of the property is determined
neither by the time at which legal title is acquired,2 5 nor by the time at which
an equitable interest is acquired,2 6 nor even by the time at which a legally cog-
nizable right or interest was first acquired;27 rather, the courts look behind the
19 Crouch v. Richardson, 158 La. 822, 104 So. 728 (1925); Sauvage v. Wauhop,
143 S.W 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
20 132 Cal. 320, 64 Pac. 410 (1901).
21 Pancoast v. Pancoast, 57 Cal. 320 (1881).
22 Id. at 321.
2394 Cal. App. 453, 271 Pac. 542 (1928).
2 4 Vieux v. Vieux, 80 Cal. App. 222, 251 Pac. 640 (1926).
25 lb~t.
26 Ibtd.
2 7 Modem Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 Pac. 754 (1931).
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form of the transaction and characterize the property according to the character
of that which provided the consideration for the property acquired. Further,
when a single item of property is acquired in exchange for both separate and
community property, the property acquired will be considered separate in part
and community in part.28
In Vieux v. Vieux29 the husband paid part of the purchase price for certain
property with his funds prior to marriage while subsequent payment was made
after marriage with community funds. The community was entitled to share in
the profits on resale of the property in the proportion that community funds had
contributed to its purchase. The husband had not only an equitable interest, but
also legal title to the property prior to the mamage, but because of the contri-
bution of actual funds of the community, the proceeds on resale were apportioned
between the husband and the community.
Apportionment of the value of an interest in property accordingly as separate
and community interests contribute to acquisition is fully justified by the principle
that the character of property is unaffected by a change in its form or identity.O
There is, however, another consideration which lends further support to appor-
tionment. By statute the husband is given management and control of the com-
munity property.s1 Thus an opportunity would be presented to a husband to
defraud his wife of her share of the community property if apportionment did
not follow from the application of community funds to complete the acquisition
of what initially was his separate property in the case where the first legally
cogmzable interest was acquired by the husband prior to marriage. This danger
was recognmzed in Vieux v. Vieux.3 2 It is the management and control of the com-
munity property given to the husband by statute which justifies the presumption
of a gift to the wife when community funds are used to complete the acquisition
of what initially was her separate property in the case where the first legally
cognizable interest was acquired by the wife prior to mamage. This presumption
of gift usually results in the entire property remaining separate property of the
wife.3 3 Thus, this presumption does not conflict with the principle upon which
apportionment is based.
Apportionment has been allowed even where a very limited right was obtained
by the commencement of the transactions which eventually resulted in the ac-
quisition of a substantial amount of property. In Modern Woodmen of Amernca
v. Gray s4 the husband, prior to his second marriage, obtained a life insurance
policy on himself in which no equity was acquired by payment of the premiums
and which was void ipso facto on the failure to pay any premium. At the time
of his second marriage he had only the right to keep the policy in force by the
regular payment of the premiums; he would have been ineligible, because of
28Faust v. Faust, 91 Cal. App. 2d 304, 204 P.2d 906 (1949); Vieux v. Vieux, 80
Cal. App. 222, 251 Pac. 640 (1926).
2980 Cal. App. 222, 251 Pac. 640 (1926).
30 Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944); Hicks v. Hicks, 211 Cal.
App. 2d 144, 151, 27 Cal. Rptr. 307, 312 (1962).
81 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 172.
3280 Cal. App. 222, 227, 251 Pac. 640, 642 (1926).
33 Estate of Bematas, 162 Cal. App. 2d 693, 328 P.2d 539 (1958).
84113 Cal. App. 729, 299 Pac. 754 (1931).
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age, to acquire a snilar policy had the existing one lapsed. After the marriage
the premiums were paid out of community funds. On the husband's death the
proceeds were considered separate and community property in proportion as
separate and community funds had been used for the payment of the premiums.
The court held that a new contract was not created with the payment of each
premium 35 and that prior to this second marriage the husband had acquired a
valuable right which the law would protect-the right to continue the insurance
policy in force.3 6 This right was a legally cognizable interest in property which
was acquired and preserved in exchange for both separate and community prop-
erty. When on the death of the husband substantial funds resulted from the
policy, they had to be apportioned as community and separate funds had been
used in acquiring and maintaining the policy.
A Specil Problem on Termznation
The same principles followed in the characterization of property acquired
during a period which overlaps the creation of the community apply to the char-
actenzation of property acquired during a period which overlaps its termination.
Unfortunately, an additional problem often arises at the termination of the com-
munity. Rarely will a question of the characterization of property arise where
the acqiusition is initiated during marriage unless the marriage is terminated by
divorce. Where the marriage is terminated by death the only question will usually
be whether an enforceable interest was acquired in the property. Thus, most of
the cases requiring the characterization of property acquired in a period over-
lapping the termination of the community arse in divorce actions. At this time
the process of acquisition may have progressed no further than some initial step
taken during mamage. Whether the acquisition will be completed, what the ex-
tent of the interest will be if completed, and what the value of the interest will
be upon completion may all be unanswerable questions at the time of divorce.
The California statutes look to the final disposition of the community property
at the time of divorce,3 7 yet at this time the interest in property may not actually
be a tangible part of the assets of the community. The court may grant a divorce
and reserve adjudication of property rights for a subsequent determination,38 but
this would not be a satisfactory solution unless there were some time in the rea-
sonably near future when, if ever, the property would definitely have been
acquired and be capable of valuation. Faced with the problem of dividing an
interest in property which is contingent as to either ultimate acquisition or final
value or both, and under pressure to provide a final disposition of the property
interests between the spouses, the courts seem on occasion to have confused the
nature of the problem before them.8 9 The following suggests an analytical tech-
35 Id. at 732, 299 Pac. at 755.
s6 IMbi.
37 CAL. CIV. CoDE § 146. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 149 (providing, in divorce actions,
for jurisdiction over community property without personal service).
8Elms v. Elms, 4 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 52 P.2d 223, 225 (1935). See also Hull v.
Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 139, 5 Cal. Rptr. 1, 352 P.2d 161 (1960) (concept of di-
visible divorce).
39 See Speer v. Speer, 209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962). Here the
court apparently held that the husband's interest in the assets of a corporation, which
was indebted to him and of which he was a half owner, was a mere expectancy and not
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uque to facilitate characterization and division of community property in these
cases.
The Existence of an Interest
Before attempting to characterize and divide an interest in property in a di-
vorce action, the court must determine whether the interest exists for the court's
further consideration as to character and division. This is a problem distinct from
both characterization and division. It is also a problem which has caused some
difficulty for the courts.
To qualify as an existing interest for further consideration by the court as to
character and division, the interest does not have to be presently ascertainable
either as to final value or ultimate acquisition.40 When an interest in property is
held by one or both of the spouses which might to some extent be community in
character and which at some time may possibly be finally acquired and valuated,
it exists for further consideration by the court. The interest is placed before the
court for its consideration when one of the spouses puts the character or owner-
ship of the interest in issue.41 Thus in Secondo v. Secondo,42 where the uncon-
troverted testimony of the husband was that certain community funds had been
spent and he was not accountable to the community for their loss, there was no
interest in property existing for further consideration by the court. However, in
a similar case, where the husband was unable to explain the disappearance of a
substantial amount of community funds, he was held accountable to the com-
munity for the loss. 43 Because the husband was accountable for the loss, "prop-
erty" existed for further consideration by the court.
The difficulty which the courts have had with the problem of determining the
existence of an interest in property seems to lie n an inability to restrict their
consideration to that specific question. In Secondo, the court went beyond hold-
ing that the funds were not in existence and said that the court could not divide
an interest in property wuch was not in the hands of the court.4 4 This seems to
have been an unfortunate choice of words. In other cases this statement has been
misapplied. As a result interests in property have apparently been held not to be
before the court for further consideration as to character and division when in
fact they did exist within the limitation of Secondo v. Secondo and the deter-
mination of their character was placed in issue by the parties.45 Since in a divorce
action the court has the power to determine the nghts, as between the spouses,
to all interests in property which are placed in issue,48 it is certainly incorrect to
subject to division on divorce. An alternative basis for the decision, however, seems to
be that the sum awarded the wife as her share of the community interest in the business
was beyond the husband's capacity to pay.
40 Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946).
41 Smith v. Smith, 40 Cal. 2d 461, 254 P.2d 1 (1953); Huber v. Huber, 27 Cal. 2d
784, 167 P.2d 708 (1946).
42218 Cal. 453, 23 P.2d 752 (1933).
43 White v. White, 26 Cal. App. 2d 524, 79 P.2d 759 (1938).
44 218 Cal. at 458, 23 P.2d at 754.
45 Speer v. Speer, 209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962); Hill v. Hill,
82 Cal. App. 2d 682, 187 P.2d 28 (1947).
46 McClenny v. Supenor Court, 62 Cal. 2d 140, 41 Cal. Rptr. 460, 396 P.2d 916
(1964).
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hold that the husband's interest in a corporation 47 or the husband's interest in
partnership assets48 is not in the hands of the court.40
In the Secondo case the funds claimed to be community property no longer
existed. There was nothing for the court to divide. As a result the wife's claim
was dismissed. 5o The determination of the existence of an interest in property
is an essential preliminary step to characterization and division, but this restric-
tion should be confined to existence in the sense of the Secondo case. Having
concluded that there is an existing interest in property for its further consider-
ation, the court can then proceed with a determination of its character as com-
munity or separate.
The Characterization at Termwation
If the courts restrict their consideration to property interests which exist
within the meaning of the restriction set forth above, only ordinary difficulties
of characterization will be encountered. Characterization is based on the same
principles when acquisition overlaps termination of the marital community as
when it overlaps creation. The same facts are necessary and sufficient for the
determination. It is, however, important that the characterization of existing
property interests be treated as a distinct problem from the division of the prop-
erty. The failure to make this distinction may be the reason the courts have
seemingly fallen into error in the analysis of difficult problems of property divi-
sion in cases such as Speer v. Speer5l and French v. French.52
The three property interests involved in the case of French V. French53 illus-
trate the clarification which results when the suggested analysis is followed.
Indeed, the criticism to which the French case has been subjected 4 might have
been avoided if this analysis had been followed, although the ultimate disposition
of the property would probably have been no different. The three property in-
terests involved in that case were: (1) the husband's reserve pay for services
rendered prior to divorce, (2) reserve pay for services rendered after divorce,
and (3) the retirement pay which the husband would receive upon completion
of fourteen more years in the Fleet Reserve. The reserve pay, in essence, con-
stituted wages given in exchange for the husband's duties in the Fleet Reserve.
Thus the reserve pay was community property only for the services rendered
during the existence of the marital community. The retirement pay was considered
a mere expectancy by the court and not subject to division as community
property.55
In this case all three interests existed within the limitation of Secondo. They
were interests in property held by one of the spouses which at some time might
be reducible to money and which might to some extent be community in char-
47 Speer v. Speer, 209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962).
48 Hill v. Hill, 82 Cal. App. 2d 682, 187 P.2d 28 (1947).
49 Caruchael v. Carmichael, 216 Cal. App. 2d 674, 31 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1963).
50 Secondo v. Secondo, 218 Cal. 453, 23 P.2d 752 (1933).
51209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962).
5 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
53 Ibid.
54See Note, 30 CAIF. L. REv. 469 (1942).
55 French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
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acter. Thus, the interests existed for further consideration by the court as to
character and division. The interests were placed in the hands of the court for
its consideration when the wife placed the character of the interests in issue in
the divorce action. Thus the court should have proceeded with a characterization
of the three interests.
Wages are characterized by the character of the labor for which they are
exchanged. 56 As the reserve pay was given in exchange for services rendered by
the husband in the Fleet Reserve, the court properly characterized the pay as
community property only for those services rendered during the existence of the
community. The interest in the retirement pay, however, should probably have
been characterized as separate property in which the community had no interest,
not as a mere expectancy57 winch was not subje.ct to division. The character of
the property was placed in issue and the interest existed to an extent sufficient
for the court's consideration. The mere fact that an interest is not presently sub-
ject to valuation is not a sufficient reason for refusing to characterize the interest.5 8
The character of property as separate or community is independent of the time
the interest is capable of valuation.59
Under the facts of the case it seems the court, following such an analysis,
would have concluded that the retirement pay was property in the nature of a
windfall in which no legally cognizable interest had been acquired. While the
husband's interest in the fund existed in the sense necessary to justify further
consideration by the court under the limitation of the Secondo case, it does not
follow necessarily that he had acquired a legally cognizable right or interest in
the fund. If the husband had no legally cognizable right or interest in the fund
until he completed fourteen more years of service, the interest in the retirement
pay would be analogous to the acquisition of property by adverse possession. Of
course, if the court found that the husband had acquired a legally cognizable
interest in the fund during marriage, then it would have to characterize the retire-
ment pay as community property in proportion as community property or labor
had contributed to the acquisition of the interest. In this particular case, however,
it seems no cognizable right or interest was acquired during marriage, though in
most pension plans an interest in the fund is acquired by payment into the fund.60
The French case illustrates quite clearly the advantage of the separation of
56 Pedder v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1932).
57 The court held that the husband's interest m the retirement pay was a mere
expectancy, but from the reasoning it appears that a contingency is what the court
meant. Receapt of any retirement pay was contingent on completion of fourteen more
years of service in the Fleet Reserve. 17 Cal. 2d at 778, 112 P.2d at 237.
Bs In the French case the court seemed to concede that the husband's interest in
the retirement fund was community property, but it is unclear whether the court refused
to divide the property because it was an expectancy, or whether the community had no
present interest in the fund because it was not then certain that something would be
acquired from the fund.
59 Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946). In this case the
court had no difficulty characterizing a contingent fee partially earned by the husband
during coverture as community property in part, although at that time the realization
of any property from labors of the husband was still in doubt.
60 Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936); Cros-
san v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939).
May, 196] NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the questions of existence, characterization, and division. This advantage lies not
so much in reaching the right result, which seems to occur almost invariably be-
cause the right result appears usually to be the "equitable' result, but rather that
in a difficult case such as French, this analysis places the crucial question squarely
before the court.
Division of Property
A satisfactory techique for the determination of what property interests are
existing for the court's further consideration and for characterization still does not
provide a complete solution to the problems of the court in dividing community
property on divorce. Where, as perhaps should have been the case in French,
the court can properly conclude that the interest in property is in the nature of
a windfall, where no legally cognizable interest has yet been acquired, it must
conclude that the community has no interest therein. In French, the analogy to
the cases where property in the nature of a windfall is acquired seems plausible.
The retirement pension may very well be properly considered a gratuity whnch
is acquired merely by the serving of the requisite number of years.
On the other hand, where payment is made into a pension plan by salary
deductions or where the payments by the employer into the pension fund are
considered a part of the wages, it seems unlikely that no legally cognizable right
or interest is acquired in the fund prior to retirement.61 In the usual case an em-
ployee has some interest in the fund, such as the right to recover his payments
if he terminates his employment prior to retirement.62 In such a case the courts
have held the community is entitled to share in the fund.63 Where the total paid
into the fund can be withdrawn, the value of the interest in the fund is readily
ascertainable. The court has no difficulty in awarding a lump sum to the wife as
her share of the community's interest in the fund.
Where the realization of any funds from the pension fund is subject to a con-
tingency that the spouse continue in the same employment until retirement the
court is faced with greater difficulties. The present value of the interest in such
a fund is calculable, but the award of a lump sum as a share of the community
interest in such a fund might impose considerable hardship. This may have been
the reason the court held the community had no interest in the pension fund in
Williamson v. Williamson.6 4 As payments had been made into the pension fund
in the form of salary deductions, in that case, it seems almost impossible that the
husband had acquired no legally cognizable right or interest in the fund. If this
were true the employer could decide to refuse to pay the pension at any time
prior to retirement and the employee would have no remedy.65 The right to keep
61 Kent, Penston Funds and Problems Under California Community Property Laws,
2 STN. L. REv. 447 (1950). This article points out that most pension plans provide a
particular time when the employee's interest in the fund vests.
0
2 See Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 94 P.2d 609 (1939).
68 Ibid.
64 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962).
65 The court conceded in the Williamson case that the husband had a vested right
in the pension fund in the sense that it could not be arbitrarily withdrawn. The court
held, however, it was not vested mi the sense that the community should share in the
fund because it was still contingent as to whether any funds would definitely be re-
ceived. Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11-12, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(1962).
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a pension plan in force should constitute a legally cognizable right which the law
will protect just as it will protect the right to keep an insurance policy in force.
In Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray6N this right was sufficient to justify
characterization based on the principle of exchange. It seems more likely in the
Williamson case that because the nature of the interest was such that no equitable
division could be made at the time of divorce, the court held that the husband
had no present interest in the pension fund.
67
The fact that no equitable division of certain property interests can be made
at the time of divorce may even result from the situation of the parties, rather
than the nature of the property interests. This may very well have been the real
problem in Speer.68 In that case the court appears to have held that the husband's
interest in a corporation in which he was one-half owner was not before the
court. It seems more reasonable that the court merely recognized the hardship
which would be imposed if the husband were forced to pay the wife's share of
the community interest at that time. It has been suggested that this was the real
basis of the decision.69
The solution to these problems seems to lie in machinery whereby the ulti-
mate satisfaction of property interests can be postponed at the discretion of the
court until a more satisfactory time than divorce.70 With such machinery the
court could determine the rights as between the spouses to some interest in prop-
erty, but postpone satisfaction of these rights until the property is ultimately
acquired or the hardship which would be mposed by immediate satisfaction is
removed. Justification for such machinery is found by analogy to rights of com-
munity creditors in following community property into the hands of the wife
after divorce.
71
It is well established that a creditor can follow community property received
by the wife on divorce and subject it to the satisfaction of debts for which the
community property was liable during marriage.7 2 Theoretically it might seem
the property should be hers absolutely, but she takes community property on
division in divorce cum onere. The community property received by the wife on
division in divorce is even subject to liability for debts which were uncertain at
the time of division as to liability and amount.79 The reasoning which justifies a
creditor's power to subject community property received by the wife on divorce
66 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 Pac. 754 (1931).
67 203 Cal. App. 2d at 12, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
68209 Cal. App. 2d 233, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1962).
69 Note, 36 So. CAL. L. REV. 486 (1963).
70See Waters v. Waters, 75 Cal. App. 2d 265, 170 P.2d 494 (1946). In this case
the court apparently saw no problem in treating the contingent fees of the husband as
presently existing property, although at that time a case in which one of the fees would
be earned was being appealed.
71 Where alimony is awarded to a spouse in a divorce action, machinery to provide
for the division of contingent interests in property is not necessary to reach an equitable
result because changed circumstances of the parties will permit alteration of the alimony
awarded, at the discretion of the court. CAL. Civ. CoD. § 139, Dean v. Dean, 59 Cal.
2d 655, 31 Cal. Rptr. 64, 381 P.2d 944 (1963).
72 Bank of America v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279 (1935); Mayberry v.
Whittier, 144 Cal. 322, 78 Pac. 16 (1904); Vest v. Supenor Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d
91, 294 P. 2d 988 (1956).
78 Frankel v. Boyd, 106 Cal. 608, 39 P. 939 (1895).
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